UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 11
Issue 2 Computer/Law Journal - Spring 1991

Article 2

Spring 1991

Legal Aspects of Transborder Data Flows, 11 Computer L.J. 233
(1991)
Hon. Justice Michael Kirby A.C., C.M.G.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science
and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hon. Justice Michael Kirby, A.C., C.M.G., Legal Aspects of Transborder Data Flows, 11 Computer L.J. 233
(1991)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol11/iss2/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized administrator
of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSBORDER
DATA FLOWS
THE HON. JUSTICE MICHAEL

I.

KIRBY, A.C., C.M.G.*

INTRODUCTION

The rapid increase in transborder data flows ("TBDF"), otherwise
known as "informatics," has created a number of legal problems of high
complexity. Of its nature, law tends to be related to a particular territorial jurisdiction. TBDF is a global phenomenon. It mocks legal jurisdiction, defies its effectiveness, and challenges its capacity to keep pace
with the range and complexity of the problems presenting. Sometimes
international cooperation leads to the "soft law" of guidelines, such as
the influential Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") guidelines on privacy and TBDF. However, generally
little is done. National laws are developed which are ineffective to deal
with multinational issues. Worse still they may be inefficient. The
need for harmonization and international approaches must be stressed.
The urgent need for institutional solutions must be emphasized. This is
illustrated by reference to instances of TBDF crime. This article discusses the legal issues raised by the use of modern technology to send
information, such as personal or financial information, across international borders.
II.

THE PRIVACY PHENOMENON

I came to this issue in an unusual way. In 1975 I was appointed the
first Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission. That body
was established by Act of the Australian Parliament to provide advice
on the reform and modernization of federal law. After a change of gov* President, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia; Com-

panion of the Order of Australia; Chairman, OECD Expert Group on Transborder Data
Barriers and the Protection of Privacy (1978-80); Governor, International Council for
Computer Communications (1984-present); Commissioner, International Commission of
Jurists (1984-present). This article is based on a paper presented at Inter Comm 90, the

Global Telecommunications Congress and Exhibition held in Vancouver, British Columbia on October 25, 1990.
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eminent in 1975, and pursuant to an election pledge, the new government asked the Commission to study and report upon the need for
legislation to protect privacy. Australia's highest court had held in 1934
that there was no common law right to privacy enforceable in the
courts.' The request to examine Australia's laws on privacy made specific reference to the new information technology and the special dangers presented to privacy by the advent of computers linked by
telecommunications.
Coinciding with this project, a number of national authorities and
international agencies began proposing laws or guidelines for the defence of privacy in the age of informatics. The Nordic Council was
amongst the first. A Canadian report was extremely influential. 2
Drawing on general statements of human rights which included reference to individual privacy,3 the Council of Europe in 1980 adopted a
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data. In an attempt to extend the developing
principles on privacy protection towards intercontinental application
and record keeping, the OECD in Paris in 1978 summoned an Expert
Group to formulate guidelines. Because of the work I was doing in Australia on the development of national privacy principles, I was sent to
this Expert Group as my country's representative. In due course, I was
elected Chairman of the Expert Group. It developed guidelines which
in September 1980 were adopted by the Council of the OECD in the
form of a recommendation to member states. 4 Those states include the
developed countries of Western Europe, North America, Japan and
Australasia. After some delay, all member countries accepted the recommendation of the Council of the OECD. The Guidelines, therefore,
became a basis of agreed action for the protection of privacy in the context of TBDF. Although the OECD recommendations were not binding, they have influenced the development of national and subnational
laws and policies. In Australia, the Privacy Act 1988 schedules "privacy
principles" which amount to an adaptation of the OECD guidelines. In
Canada, the Canadian Privacy Act, with the complementary Access to
Information Act came into force on July 1, 1983.5 The Canadian Privacy Act affords rights to citizens and permanent residents to examine
information about themselves under the control of federal institutions.
It replaced and expanded provisions in the Canadian Human Rights
1. Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd. v. Taylor, 58 C.L.R. 479
(1937).
2. CANADA DEP'T OF COMM. AND DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS (1972).

3. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17; the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8.
4. See infra pp. 240-41.
5. Can. Stat. 1980-81-82-83, ch. 111.
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Act. The Canadian Privacy Act embodies the eight OECD principles.
Those principles have also been adopted in Canada by private sector
organizations.
The motivation for the preparation of the OECD guidelines was
complex. Preparing quasi legal norms has not been a feature of the operations of the OECD. But with the rapid development of national and
subnational laws for the protection of privacy, operating on the technological phenomenon of informatics (and specifically TBDF), it became
apparent by the mid-1970's that a lack of consistency of approach would
have adverse economic and social consequences. It might be impossible
for those dealing in data to comply with different national laws in respect of data flows passing though (or accessible in) multiple jurisdictions. Further, the lack of consistent laws could lead to inefficiencies
and inhibitions on the desirable flow of data or bureaucratic machinery
designed to reconcile the incompatible legal obligations of data carriers
and users. In this way, it was thought that if a general legal regime confirming basic guidelines could be laid down and followed in national and
subnational laws and policies, the inefficiencies or at least gross inconsistency of regulation could be avoided. At the same time, the basic
right to privacy could be upheld in multiple jurisdictions, notwithstanding the international nature of the technology from which the danger to
privacy could sometimes arise.
It is in this way that a practicing judge, at home in the daily
problems of the courts, became involved in the technology of informatics (the marriage of computers and telecommunications) and the intricacies of legal regulation of TBDF. An insight into the difficulties, and
the urgent necessity of protecting the value of the privacy in TBDF,
takes the rational mind to a consideration of other legal and social
problems that present from this phenomenon. It raises the fundamental question of what organization will take initiatives similar to that
which the OECD took in establishing guidelines for the protection of
privacy. At a time when it is commonplace to boast of the triumph of
the rule of law, it is a hollow boast if the law proves itself incompetent
to tackle the myriad of problems presented from a source which is at
once highly technological in nature and global in impact.
III.

TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS

TBDF may be broadly defined as the transfer of computerized data
across national borders. 6 The data transferred by TBDF may be scientific, economic, technical or personal. The media may be ordinary text
on microfilm, punched cards or computer listings transmitted by ordi6. Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Centrum voor Internationaal Strafrecht, The TronborderFlow of PersonalData, COMPUTER & LAw 3 (Oct. 1989).
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nary mail. It may be in "machine readable form," such as the diskette
upon which the hard copy of this paper was sent by mail to Canada.
But it will generally be computerized data. This represents by far the
greatest source of TBDF. Such data may be transmitted from a terminal to a computer system as part of an international network. The data
are then processed in the system and sent back to the terminal. The
data may be stored on line in a network directly accessible to anyone
with a key to enter the system. Alternatively, it may be transported
through telephone lines, specific data networks, by satellite, etc.
International transfer of data can take at least five forms. 7 First, it
may be in the form of non-market flows, such as the domestic data passing through the computer network of a multinational corporation. Second, it may pass through market flows, such as a commercial flow
arising from access to foreign data banks or a foreign data processing
bureau. Third, it may be related to international transactions such as
electronic transfer of funds ("EFT"). Fourth, there are data flows
within a closed user group. Member banks, for example, use the
SWIFT network. They pay a fixed price for every message. Access to
the network is limited to members. Finally, there are operational flows
including international transfer of software or data. These include the
international remote maintenance of a system or the use of a backup
system located abroad as security against accidents, terrorism, viruses or
other sources of the vulnerability of informatics systems. Very many
services today depend upon the international transfer of data. The most
obvious cases are seen in the industries built on insurance, air transport,
credit facilities and tourism. The modern international corporations
could not operate without TBDF.
Increasingly large quantities of data flow across borders in the
course of trade and industry. Several nations recognized this fact, and
its obvious implications for the protection of privacy and the effectiveness of local laws to that end, led to early licensing legislation designed
control the transfer of personal data on local citizens for automatic
processing abroad. This was the effect of the Swedish Data Act of 1973.
The idea was soon seized upon by Brazil as a means, less for the protection of the human rights of local citizens than for protectionism of local
industry.8 Hence the Brazilian government developed the policy on
7. Id.
8. Perhaps more than any other country, Brazil has designed a full set of policies to
deal with TBDF. Its efforts arose out of a national computer policy which aimed to create
a national computer capability. Since 1972, a federal agency in Brazil has supervised the

use and acquisition of computers. In 1978, legislation required that all transnational computer communication systems should be subject to the approval of the agency. Putting it
generally, the government of Brazil does not allow the use of computers placed abroad
which through teleinformatics would accomplish tasks whose solutions could be obtained
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TBDF. There was a fear that such local regulation, enacted ostensibly
for privacy protection, would in truth be aimed at economic protectionism. This fear was one of the stimuli that led to the initiative of the
OECD to establish the expert group which developed its Privacy Guidelines. The spectre was presented that these national laws might unnecessarily impede the economically beneficial flow of data across national
boundaries. Further, this could lead to a cacophony of laws which do
little to advance human rights but much to interfere in the free flow of
information and ideas.
In the development of the OECD Guidelines there was something
of a tension between the viewpoints of the countries of Europe (with
which Canada was more closely associated) and that of the United
States of America. The continental countries of Europe had, within living memory, seen the misuse of files of personal data kept in hard copy
form in folders. There was therefore a sensitivity to the practical necessity of protecting privacy and the imperative obligation to do so even in
the case of a new technology which might keep and process the data
outside the jurisdiction but provide for its retrieval within the jurisdiction. On the other hand, the United States, nurtured in attitude by the
free flow of information guaranteed by the First Amendment to its
Constitution, urged the primacy of the value of free data flows and the
need to avoid unnecessary inhibitions upon them. It was perhaps only
coincidental that the economic interests of the United States, as dominant in the technology of informatics, also favoured free flows; whereas
the infant industries of Europe might be advantaged by local regulation.
The OECD Guidelines contain, at their core, eight basic principles
to govern the protection of personal data in TBDF. These are:
1. The collection limitation principle: data should be obtained lawfully
and fairly;
2. The data quality principle: data should be relevant to their purposes, accurate, complete and up-to-date;
3. The purpose specification principle: the identification of the pur-

poses for which data will be used and destruction of the data if no
longer necessary to serve that purpose;
4. The use limitation principle: use for purposes other than those specified is authorized only with consent of the data subject or by authority of law;
5. The security safeguard principle: procedures to guard against loss,
corruption, destruction or misuse of data should be established;
6. The openness principle: it should be possible to acquire information
about the collection, storage and use of personal data systems;
in Brazil. JDO Brazada, Address at the Opening Session of the IBI World Conference on
Transborder Data Flow Policies, reprinted in TRANSNATIONAL DATA REPORT 33 (July
1982).
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7. The individual participation principle: the data subject normally has
a right of access and to challenge data relating to him or her; and
8. The accountability principle: a data controller should be designed
and accountable for complying with the measures to give effect to
the principles.

However, the OECD Guidelines also contain principles of international application. In paragraph 15, member countries were obliged to
take into consideration the implications for other member countries of
domestic processing and re-export of personal data. In paragraph 16,
they were to take all reasonable steps and appropriate steps to ensure
that TBDF of personal data, including in transit, are "uninterrupted
and secure." Limits on the restriction of TBDF were accepted in paragraph 17. In paragraph 18, member States of the OECD were pledged
to avoid developing laws, policies and practices "in the name of the protection of privacy and individual liberties which would create obstacles
to [TBDF] of personal data that would exceed requirements for such
protection."
The OECD has not rested on its laurels in this field where its work
has been so influential. In 1985, a Declaration on Transborder Data
Flows was accepted by which the member countries of the OECD acknowledged the importance of free TBDF, both for countries and for
trading enterprises. The general principle of the free flow of information, the openness of policies on TBDF and the desirability of harmonizing national approaches were also accepted. In 1988, the OECD
established a Commission for Computerized Information and Privacy.
It envisaged revision of the guidelines in 1990. The advance of the technology of informatics has made some of the provisions of the 1980
OECD Guidelines questionable, or at least needing of consideration.
The purpose specification principle, for example, may nowadays be
readily circumvented by technological developments which permit
searching of data for identifiers which were not specifically considered
at the time when the data was originally collected. It is in this way that
it is essential, in developing guidelines (still more legislation) to deal
with information technology issues, to keep pace with the technological
developments which constantly enhance and change in relevant ways
the capacity of the technology.
IV.

VULNERABILITY OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Privacy protection is but one concern presented to our societies by
the advance of informatics. Another concern was discussed at an expert
meeting held in Toronto in February 1990 under the auspices of a
number of international banks, brought together by the Royal Bank of
Canada. The experts examined the problems presented by the manipulation of information systems, sometimes with fraudulent intent, some-
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times without intent to secure personal gain but with reckless
indifference to the consequence of the conduct involved. A feature of
the manipulation of TBDF has been the enormous damage that can be
done, especially by the introduction of computer viruses. Cases include:
* The example of Robert T. Morris, Jr. who introduced a "worm" into
information systems with consequences involving financial losses to
those affected estimated to amount to $97 million. Some observers
had condoned the activities of a brilliant student who demonstrated
the inadequacy of computer security for protecting the data. Others
regarded the conduct as seriously antisocial, requiring deterrent punishments and civil liability laws to make intrusions less attractive
and to spread the burden of the losses caused by them. Mr. Morris
was convicted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (US); and
* In late 1989, thousands of personal computer diskettes were distributed, ostensibly with data about the AIDS virus. These diskettes
contained a very serious "Trojan Horse." It disabled information systems into which they were inserted, allegedly for the purpose of extracting an extortion for the retrieval of the otherwise lost data. The
alleged perpetrator of the offence was arrested in Cleveland (USA)
on a warrant issued in London, England from where most of the diskettes were posted world-wide (although not to the United States
and Canada). The diskettes were allegedly distributed for a Panama
registered company. Although not involving international financial
information directly, the case neatly illustrated the interjurisdictional character of many information offenses today.
There are many other cases which illustrate the inadequacies of
substantive law to cope with new problems presented by information
technology. One of the most notable is a decision of the English House
of Lords in The Queen v. Gold.9 An accused had secured access to data
bases by using another person's access code and password. He was prosecuted for forgery under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act of 1981. It
was necessary to show that the accused had made a false "instrument."
That word was defined to mean (amongst other things) "any disc, tape,
sound track or other device on or in which information is recorded or
stored by mechanical, electronic or other means .... 10 The prosecu-

tion argued that the false instrument was the buffer in the computer
containing the false information while it was being checked. The English courts disagreed. They were scathing of the "Procrustean attempt
to force these facts into the language of an Act not designed to fit
them.. ."I' The judges urged that, if new legislation were to cover computers, it would need to "be better targeted." There are many like cases
which illustrate the difficulty of applying the words of the common law
9. 2 All E.R. 186 (1988).
10. See id. at 189.
11. Id. at 191 (Lord Lane, CJ) (quoting 3 All E.R. 1987, 618 at 622-23).
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or of statutes to new problems presented by information technology.
Where those problems have the international character of TBDF, they
are rendered even more difficult to solve.
At the Toronto conference on the vulnerability of international
flows of financial information, it was recognized that even if deficiencies
of substantive law definitions could be overcome, there are other practical problems in securing cooperation of law enforcement and private
sector agencies over jurisdictional borders. The participants urged:
* The need to pool information on incidents and losses in order to disclose patterns of fraudulent transactions by repeat offenders;
* The need to cooperate in police and other training, including in specialized colleges in several jurisdictions;
* The need to recruit and pay at an appropriate level highly skilled police and other investigators to assist in the detection and prosecution
of offenders having connection with a number of jurisdictions;
* The need to secure cooperation between common carriers and agencies providing telecommunication services and police and, if necessary, changes to the law, to permit (under appropriate conditions of
confidentiality) the monitoring of electronic transactions to detect
"hackers" and other persons engaged in information offenses;
* The need to enhance formal and informal cooperation between law
enforcement and like agencies across jurisdictional borders; and
* The need to reform the law to increase the power of investigating
agencies to cope with new problems presented by interjurisdictional
offenses.
Any study of these issues requires consideration of the national
laws that have been passed in an attempt to cope with manipulation of
TBDF of financial data in connection with a number of jurisdictions.
These national laws include:
* The need for the passage of "long-arm statutes" with purported extra
territorial operation of one state's law in another legal jurisdiction;
* The negotiation of extradition treaties providing for the return of accused persons for trial on a wider range of offenses and on new principles of mutuality and reciprocity;
* The enlargement of formal and informal exchanges between law enforcement and like agencies;
* The negotiation of bilateral treaties to deal with particular offenses;
and
* The reduction of disparities among new laws by the development of
international guidelines designed to promote the harmonization of
the expression of new data offenses.
The Toronto meeting emphasized the need for new initiatives,
along the lines of the OECD Privacy Guidelines, to promote the harmonization of principles upon which future domestic laws for the protection of vulnerable TBDF of financial data could be modelled. A
number of the participants thought that the OECD would be the most
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suitable venue for intercontinental work of this character, relevant to
the major players in the international data flows of vulnerable financial
information. It may be hoped that the OECD will respond to repeated
suggestions of this kind. A sign of hope that it may do so is the expression of personal opinion by Dr. H. P. Gassmann, a senior and highly experienced officer of the OECD that "the OECD could. . . be more used
for rule-making."' 2 Whilst emphasizing that this was a personal view,
Dr. Gassmann certainly reflects opinions which were expressed at the
meeting in Toronto and elsewhere. Unless an initiative is taken somewhere, the result is that nothing gets done. This reveals a major institutional gap in the strategy of addressing the problems posed by
informatics and, particularly, by TBDF.
V. OTHER ISSUES
There are many other issues of a legal character presented by
TBDF. Amongst the most urgent is the need for a new international
regime to protect intellectual property in the context of informatics.
Traditionally, intellectual property law was developed to provide protection to the medium rather than to the content of valuable information. It was not possible to patent or copyright an abstract idea. Patents
attached to "inventions." Copyright attached to an original "work."
The law of confidence and the law of defamation attached their consequences, typically, to the act of unwarranted communication or publication rather than to the information itself.
The problem posed by information technology is that data (and
therefore information) have now become liberated from physical objects. Thus it has become possible, technologically, to read the text of a
book without purchasing the book or even copying the text. Information technology has, in this way, made information, as such, a valuable
commodity. The question now posed is whether the old methods of protecting intellectual property are still apt means for achieving the appropriate social balance between inventors and users of information based
systems in the age of TBDF. An added difficulty is provided by the fact
that information produced in one country may be reproduced in ephemeral form in another. Unless arrangements can be made to recompense
the original author in some way, the intellectual property in the idea
will go unrewarded.
The recognition of this problem has led to the establishment of
committees in UNESCO and in the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"). The OECD has also taken certain initiatives to ex12. Address by H.P. Gassmann Towards Free Trade in Telecommunications and Information Services. Conference on the Future of World Telecommunications and Information Technology, May 2-3, 1990.
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amine issues of intellectual property law in the context of TBDF. Some
local laws have been enacted, including in my own country. 1 3 However,
these have largely been stop-gap measures. They leave unanswered,
particularly on the international stage, the more fundamental question
of whether a more radical and novel approach is required for the protection of intellectual property interests because of the capacity of informatics and TBDF to divorce the medium and the message.
This is the fundamental question which an OECD paper has raised
about the impact of TBDF on intellectual property law. 14 That paper
said that the present legal approach may be "throwing up serious obstacles to the dissemination of information or to international trade and information, computer and communication services." The need to avoid
the "mind-lock" of old legal approaches is presented by the phenomena
of TBDF. All too often technology rushes ahead while the human
mind-and one might say the legal mind in particular-remains for a
decade, or more, captive to the technology of the past. There is nothing
new in this. Surgery before the use of anesthesia depended upon the
speed of the surgeon's performance. It was by such speed that the surgeon's skill was measured. It took more than a decade after the introduction of anesthesia as a regular feature of operative practice, for a
change in such a time-honoured approach to the professional task.
If the OECD, or some other international agency might be expected
to fill the "regulatory vacuum" on matters such as the impact of instantaneous TBDF on contract law, on the law of international insurance,
on intellectual property law and on international vulnerability and data
crimes, there are other issues which appear to lace any conceivable institutional venue. These include the relevance of TBDF to interactive
freedom of information law, to the proof of matters in courts of law and
tribunals by computer generated evidence, and even to the principles of
conflicts of laws.
Those principles of conflicts of laws are accurately presented by the
phenomenon of TBDF. An electronic message may be generated in
country A. It may be switched in countries B and C. It may transit
countries E, F, G, and H. It may then be processed in counties I and J,
stored in country K and involve entities residing in and operating in
other countries. Whose law applies to such TBDFs? Which law applies
to data processing carried out by a computer on an orbiting satellite?
The OECD Guidelines on privacy urged that member countries of
13. Stern, Computer Software Protection Under the 1984 Copyright Statutory Amendment, 60 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 333 (1986); Brazil, Infringement of Copyright and the Problem
of Piracy, 61 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 12 (1987).
14. OECD, The Information Economy-Policies and InternationalConsensus, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL RULES OF THE GAME 61 (1987).
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the OECD "should work towards the development of principles, domestic and international, to govern the applicable law in the case of transborder flows of personal data."' 5 Following that well meaning but
somewhat ineffectual plea, nothing much has been done to clarify the
applicable private international law principles as they concern TBDF.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law might help clarify
the issue. But it tends to specialize in conflict of law problems applicable to international sales of goods. The more conceptual issue of developing an effective international legal regime to determine the law, civil
and criminal, applicable to such movements of data, remains for the
future.
VI.

THE INSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

The advent of informatics and TBDF has produced an extraordinary revolution with enormous implications, not only for the economies
of every country, but also for world peace, interdependence and security. In 1985, before perestroika and glasnost arrived in the Soviet
Union, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. George Schultz, in a
speech to the National Academy of Sciences said:
The free flow of information is inherently compatible with our political
system and values. The Communist States, in contrast, fear this information explosion perhaps more than they fear Western military
strength. If knowledge is power, then the communications revolution
threatens to undermine their most important monopoly... their effort
to stifle their peoples' information, thought and independence of judg-

ment. Totalitarian societies face a dilemma: either they try to stifle
these technologies and thereby fall further behind in the new industhese technologies and see their totrial revolution or else they permit 16
talitarian control inevitably eroded.
This is the reason why, until recently, photocopiers in the Soviet
Union were locked up, why direct dialling was impossible and telephone
books unavailable. It explains why the leaders of liberal thought in
Eastern Europe and China made constant contact with sources of ideas
and encouragement outside their beleaguered lands through telecommunications, facsimile and, increasingly, interactive computers. The
global network of informatics is a great force for liberty because it renders every corner of the world interdependent, it is also a great force
15. Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal
Data, OECD 12 Paris (1981).
16. Quoting address by H.P. Gassmann: New Communications Technologies in the
Global Information Age-Policy Challenges and Social Implications, Ohio State University 1, Apr. 3, 1989.
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for peace and security. 17
But an invader from Mars would not believe the shocking neglect
of the institutional and legal issues presented by TBDF. TBDF is an
amazing technology of enormous potential in so many ways. Yet the
world has seen its advent without developing, in the twenty-five years
of the advance, any effective global institutional responses. True, the
OECD has done some valuable work. There have been useful national
enquiries on particular subjects. Private institutions and universities
have done useful research. But a coherent doctrine of TBDF law and
policy has simply not developed. It is amazing to me that such a valuable economic commodity has not produced its own servicing institutions,
if only to reduce the inefficiencies which will result from the failure to
develop internationally accepted principles. The consequence will be
either: the chaos of a multitude of voices speaking to a truly intercontinental phenomenon; a failure to act with the consequent erosion of important and hitherto protected rights; or the over-reach of the law of
the information powerful to govern the rights and duties of those in the
information poor.
We are living through a time which, in many ways, has hopeful
portents for individual liberty and economic progress. But it is not
much use boasting about the final ascendancy of the rule of law if, in
the face of an expanding international technology of the greatest importance, our law is out of date, irrelevant, inapplicable or, worse still, silent. In that realm of inadequate law or of lawlessness, the law of the
jungle is substituted for rational rules of international application. An
international technology should be better served by international institutions and international rules of the road. What is needed is quite simple. In the face of the phenomenon of TBDF we need well funded
private sector research and investigation to stimulate the development
of basic rules which may be accepted by international agencies and national governments. We also need a new initiative by international bodies addressing the many legal issues posed by TBDF. The OECD
Guidelines on Privacy showed the way. It is a pity that the momentum
built up in that most practical of international agencies in 1980 was lost.
It is to be hoped that the momentum can be rekindled both in the
OECD and in other agencies with relevant missions. Sensitivity to
human rights and to the needs of developing countries is imperative.
But for those unimpressed by humanitarian concerns, the sheer inefficiency of regulating an international technology by a multitude of diverse national laws should afford a sufficient spectre to promote
international cooperation and effective institutional responses. In a way
17. See Armstrong, Foreword to TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW: AUSTALIAN PERSPECTWFs (1990).
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that transcends technological issues, this is a fundamental question
posed for all of our countries by this meeting of Inter Comm 90.
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